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IN THE SUPRE.ME, COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAlVIAR H. CARLSON and BETTY 
~1. CARLSON, his wife, 
Plaintiff and Respondents, 
-vs.-
W. L. HAMIL'l~ON and ESTELLA 
HAl\fiLTON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8634 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the Re-
cord. The parties will be referred to as they were in 
the ·Trial Court.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment 
entered against them in the sum of $2,119.94. The sum 
awarded by the trial court was the difference between 
the total amount paid under the terms of a written sales 
agreement, and the actual damages suffered by de-
fendants as a result of plaintiffs inability to perform 
said sales agreement. 
The sales agreement which is the subject of this 
action is dated October 1, 1952, and pertains to approxi-
mately 160 acres of farm land of defendants located near 
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the City of Fairview, County of Sanpete, State of 
Utah. The property is divided into approximately 80 
acres of cultivated land with water rights (R 59) of 
which from 8 to 10 acres is designated as meadow land, 
(R 61) and 80 acres of dry pasture or hill ground (R 
61). Included in the sale was a six room two story home 
and certain farm machinery (R16). 
The sale price for tl1e farm was the sum of 
$22,000.00. This amount was to be paid $5,000 down 
and an annual payment of $1,680.00 principal and in-
terest. The plaintiffs paid to defendants the down pay-
ment of $5,000.00, and the first annual payment of 
$1,000.00 principal and $680.00 interest on January 1, 
1954. Plaintiffs were unable to meet the installment 
due January 1, 1955 (R. 9), and defendants took pos-
session of the property sometime between the date of 
the default by plaintiffs and niarch 1, 1955 (R. 11). 
This action was instituted to recover any sums of 
1noney in excess of the damages suffered by defendants 
as a result of the breach of the agree1nent. The trial 
court found that plaintiffs had paid the smn of $6,680.00 
and defendants had only been da1naged in the sun1 of 
$4,566.06 and a"'"a.rded judgn1ent to plaintiffs for the 
difference. 
ST.A.TE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND CON-
srrRUING THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE AS BEING A 
PENALTY INSTEAD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN Fit·~DING AND CON-
STRUING THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE AS BEING A 
PENALTY INSTEAD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. 
The main issue presented by defendants' brief IS 
whether defendants should be entitled to retain the sum 
of $2,119.94 as liquidated damages for plaintiffs' breach 
of the sales agreement. The defendants base their right 
to retain said sum upon the provisions of the sales 
agreement pertaining to liquidated damages. The pro-
visions of the agreement is contained in paragraph 7 
and provides as follows : 
"* * * but immediately upon the happening 
of any breach or default by the buyers, * * * 
the Sellers shall have the right to cancel and 
rescind this contract, * * * and to hold and retain 
all payments made and all improvement upon 
said premises as agreed and liquidated damage8 
for the breach of this contract, * * *" 
Defendants assert this clause of the agreement is 
not a penalty because it is an attempt by the parties 
to reasonably forecast the just compensation that may 
be due defendants for the harm that will be caused 
by plaintiffs' breach. The trial court, in support of 
plaintiff's position, held that the words "all payments 
made'' did not constitute a reasonable forecast of just 
compensation. This holding is supported by the evidence 
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and is logically sound. To demonstrate the illogic of 
defendants' novel forecast argument, assume that the 
buyer had paid $21,000.00 of the $22,000.00 total pur-
chase price. Would the recission of the contract and 
the keeping of the $21,000.00 as well as the land by the 
defendants be just compensation for the breach or would 
it be an unreasonable forfeiture~ The posing of the 
question indicates only one possible answer. 
It is our further position that whether all or a 
portion of the purchase price paid by the purchasers 
should be retained by the sellers as liquidated dan1ages 
or returned to the purchasers as unreasonable forfeiture 
is a factual question to be resolved by the court. 
In the case at bar the trial court heard all of the 
evidence and made findings pertaining to specific items 
of damages which the evidence supported. This ruling 
by the trial court properly compensated the defendants 
for all of their da1nage, and for the court to ha\e 
permitted the defendants to retain ··all payntents made" 
\Yould have resulted in the enforcen1ent of a forfeiture 
and a penalty in the smn of $2,119.94. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLl~ DENIED DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
))pf\)ndant~~ l\[otion for a X e\\~ Trial \Yas on the 
,rround~ of np\\·h~ di8eOYt:•red eYidence and insufficiencY 
~ . . 
of thP Pvidt)1H·<~ to jn~ti f~~ tht• Yedict. 
\Vith rt·~p<)et to the fir8t ground~ that of ne\Yly 
di~eoY<~r<)d <\Yid<\net·~ tl1e trial eourt eorrertly exercised 
it~ di~eret ion in den~Ting the n1otion for a ne\Y trial. 
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The granting of a motion for a new trial is generally 
within the discretion of the trial court. We submit, how-
ever, that before the trial court is permitted to exercise 
this discretion in granting a motion for a new trial on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence, the defeated 
party must meet certain requirements. These require-
ments are well stated in the case of Trimble et ux v. 
Union Pacifi'c Stages, et al., 142 P. 2d 674, 677, where the 
court stated the Utah rule to be as follows: 
"Nor do we believe that the lower court 
erred in refusing to grant a new trial. The evi-
dence of witnesses Hess and Halahan was cumu-
lative, and it is well settled in this state that 
such evidence is not ground for a nevv trial. 
I\Jopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712, 714, 
wherein it is said: 'It is well settled that, to en-
title a defeated party to a new trial on the 
ground of newly-discovered evidence, it must 
appear, (1) that he used reasonable diligence to 
discover and produce at the former trial the 
nevvly-discovered evidence, and that his failure 
to do so was not the result of his own negligence; 
(2) that the newly-discovered evidence is not 
simply cumulative; (3) that such evidence is not 
sufficient if it simply be to impeach an adverse 
witness; ( 4) it must be material to the issues, 
and so important as to satisfy the court, by 
reasonable inference, that the verdict or judg-
ment would have been different had the newly-
discovered evidence been introduced at the 
former trial; (5) that the defeated party had no 
opportunity to make the defense, or was pre-
vented from doing so by unavoidable accident, 
or the fraud or improper conduct of the other 
party, without fault on his part.' See also State 
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v. Moore, 41 Utah 247, 126 P. 322. Ann. Cas. 
1915·C, 976; Wimmer v. Simon, 9 Utah 378, 35 
P. 507; State v. Brown, 48 Utah 279, 159 P. 545." 
In the case at bar the newly discovered evidence 
is contained in an affidavit of the witness Peterson 
and pertains Ito ithe market value of the property in-
volved in the action. The testimony contained in the 
affidavit does not meet the requirements outlined in 
the Trimble case for two very important reasons. The 
first reason is there is no affidavit or other pleading 
wherein it appears that counsel used reasonable dili-
gence to discover and produce at the former trial the 
newly-discovered evidence or that the failure to pro-
duce the said evidence was not his own negligence. 
Counsel was unable to make this showing because in 
his brief he states the testimony was not produced be-
cause he did not believe that the market value of the 
property involved in the action would become material. 
This is an admission on his part that he did not use 
reasonable diligence to secure the evidence and an ad-
Inission, also, that he was negligent in failing to antici-
pate 'vhat plaintiffs contend "~as an obvious issue. 
In PerkiHs vs. Spencer, 121 Utah 46S, 243 P. 2d 446, 
at page 45:2, this court outlined as an ite1n of drunage 
to allow the seller as compensation in the eYent the for-
feitun~ clause of n sales agreen1ent is not enforced as 
foJJ 0\VH: 
u• • • (3) any decline in value due to change 
in ntarket value of the property not allo,ved for 
in i tPuts nu1nbers 1 nnd 2 * * *" 
,.v e r()~ pt)ctfully subnli t that counsel IS presu1ned 
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to have known about the ruling in the Perkins case 
and if he did not, his ingnorance in failing to anticipate 
this fact is not a basis for granting a new trial. 
The second reason is that counsel failed to show 
to the trial court that the proposed evidence would have 
altered and changed the judgment. 
At the trial of the case both parties to the action 
introduced evidence pertaining to the reasonable market 
value of the property. The plaintiffs called as a witness 
a real estate broker who was qualified as an expert in ap-
praising farm land similar to the property in ques.tion 
and the defendant qualified as an expert the defendant 
and owner of the property W H. Hamilton. These 
witness did not differ in their respective appraisals 
and the trial court p-roperly concluded that there had 
been no change in the market value of the property. 
From this testimony it was incumbent upon the 
defendant to show to the court that the proposed evi-
dence would alter the judgment. The court was apprised 
of the contents of the affidavitt and the qualifications 
of the witness Peterson, and we respectfully submit 
that his denial of the motion is a ruling he was not 
satisfied the evidence would have altered the judgment. 
It is the contention of plaintiffs that the proposed 
evidence also fails to meet the other three requirements 
outlined in the Trimble case, but it is our opinion these 
two points are sufficient to show the trial court prop-
erly denied the motion. 
The trial court properly denied the motion for 
new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the evi-
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dence. Defendants have failed to set forth in what 
particular the findings of the court or the judgment 
is not supported by the evidence, and we therefore sub-
mit, the decision of the trial court should be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that awarding plaintiffs a 
judgment in the sum of $2,119.94 is supported by the 
evidence and the law. That the denial of the motion 
for a new trial was proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Counsel for Respondents 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
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